Preventing Ultimate Harm as the Justification for Biomoral Modification

Most advocates of biogenetic modification hope to amplify existing human traits in humans in order to increase the value of such traits as intelligence and resistance to disease. These advocates defend such enhancements as beneficial for the affected parties. By contrast, some commentators recommend certain biogenetic modifications to serve social goals. As Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu see things, human moral psychology is deficient relative to the most important risks facing humanity as a whole, including the prospect of Ultimate Harm, the point at which worthwhile life is forever impossible on the planet. These risks can be mitigated, they say, by enhancing moral psychology in novel ways. Persson and Savulescu argue that some parents should modify the underlying biogenetics of their children's moral psychology, if such measures were safe and effective, but they admit these interventions may not decouple humanity from Ultimate Harm. Neither are these modifications the only options, they concede, for addressing risks to humanity. Even with these concessions, saving humanity from itself is a fairly poor reason to modify the moral psychology of children. In most ways, adults would be better candidates, morally speaking, for modifications of psychology. Even then, there is no direct link between morally enhanced human beings and the hoped‐for effect of better protection from Ultimate Harm. Asserting a general duty of all to contribute to the avoidance of Ultimate Harm is a better moral strategy than intervening in the moral psychology of some, even though meeting that duty may involve substantial interference with the free exercise of one's interests.     

The Invisibility of Disability: Using Dance to Shake from Bioethics the Idea of ‘Broken Bodies’

Complex social and ethical problems are often most effectively solved by engaging them at the messy and uncomfortable intersections of disciplines and practices, a notion that grounds the InVisible Difference project, which seeks to extend thinking and alter practice around the making, status, ownership, and value of work by contemporary dance choreographers by examining choreographic work through the lenses of law, bioethics, dance scholarship, and the practice of dance by differently‐abled dancers. This article offers a critical thesis on how bioethics has come to occupy a marginal and marginalizing role in questions about the differently‐abled body. In doing so, it has rendered the disabled community largely invisible to and in bioethics. It then defends the claim that bioethics – as a social undertaking pursued collaboratively by individuals from different disciplines – must take much better notice of the body and the embodied individual if it is to better achieve its ends, which include constructing a moral and just society. Finally, this article considers how the arts, and specifically dance (and here dance by differently‐abled dancers), provides us with rich evidence about the body and our ability to respond positively to normally ‘othered’ bodies. It concludes that greater attention to empirical evidence like that being generated in InVisible Difference will help to expand the reach and significance of bioethics, and thereby its relevance to (and consciousness of) important questions about the status of bodies and bodily differences, which must be considered as central to its ambitions.     

Weaponizing Principles: Clinical Ethics Consultations & the Plight of the Morally Vulnerable

Internationally, there is an on‐going dialogue about how to professionalize ethics consultation services (ECSs). Despite these efforts, one aspect of ECS‐competence that has received scant attention is the liability of failing to adequately capture all of the relevant moral considerations in an ethics conflict. This failure carries a high price for the least powerful stakeholders in the dispute. When an ECS does not possess a sophisticated dexterity at translating what stakeholders say in a conflict into ethical concepts or principles, it runs the risk of naming one side's claims as morally legitimate and decrying the other's as merely self‐serving. The result of this failure is that one side in a dispute is granted significantly more moral weight and authority than the other. The remedy to this problem is that ECSs learn how to expand the diagnostic moral lens they employ in clinical ethics conflicts.     

What constitutes fair shared decision-making in global health research collaborations?

Funders (located primarily in high-income countries) and high-income country researchers have historically dominated decision-making within global health research collaborations: from setting agendas and research design to determining how data are collected and analysed and what happens with findings and outputs. The ethical principle of shared decision-making has been proposed as a way to help address these imbalances within collaborations and to reduce semicolonial and exploitative forms of global health research. It is important to be clear about what shared decision-making means in order to ensure that it is not done in a tokenistic, shallow way. Thus far, the principle’s content has not been examined and articulated in detail. This paper aims to start the process of delineating a concept of fair shared decision-making as a minimum standard for global health research. Using two hypothetical case examples, the paper will demonstrate that global health research practice is often inconsistent with ideal shared decision-making. In such instances, it can be difficult to decide whether shared decision-making within collaborations is fair. The paper describes how the two cases do not meet criteria for unfair or non-ideal shared decision-making, despite having potentially morally troubling features. The nuances of these examples of research practice help to generate clearer ideas about how to judge fairness in shared decision-making. The paper concludes by presenting ideas about when soft power can be fairly employed between high-income-country and low- and middle-income-country partners and what fair compromise agreements may look like in shared decision-making.     

Can the problem of hybridization in threatened species be evaluated using a fieldwork research? A case study in snapdragons

Hybridization, natural or artificial, is considered disadvantageous for species biodiversity when it threatens the population integrity of endangered species. Frequently, studies investigating whether hybridization poses a legitimate risk to rare species are based on genetic data obtained in molecular biology laboratories. In this study, we used field research to approach the problem that hybridization could cause for the viability of a population of a rare species and to be able to propose the most appropriate initial conservation strategy. Specifically, using the model genus Antirrhinum, the reproductive barriers between the rare A. pulverulentum and its common congener A. litigiosum have been analysed under the reproductive isolation index (RI). A. pulverulentum had a high value of total RI, indicating that there are barriers to gene flow from A. litigiosum towards this species, and also had a high value for the intrinsic RI, reflecting a low inherent capacity for production of hybrid plants; in addition, the possibility of successful backcrosses between this species with hybrids produced from A. litigiosum ovules were low, given the high intrinsic RI of A. litigiosum. These data indicate the current existence of strong and permanent barriers to hybridization between the two species, suggesting that hybridization does not seem to be a serious problem for the conservation of A. pulverulentum in the studied population, nor for the near future. This study shows how the RI index can provide useful information for conservation purposes and proposes different management recommendations.     

Bisphenol A and Risk Management Ethics

It is widely recognized that endocrine disrupting compounds, such as Bisphenol A, pose challenges for traditional paradigms in toxicology, insofar as these substances appear to have a wider range of low‐dose effects than previously recognized. These compounds also pose challenges for ethics and policymaking. When a chemical does not have significant low‐dose effects, regulators can allow it to be introduced into commerce or the environment, provided that procedures and rules are in place to keep exposures below an acceptable level. This option allows society to maximize the benefits from the use of the chemical while minimizing risks to human health or the environment, and it represents a compromise between competing values. When it is not possible to establish acceptable exposure levels for chemicals that pose significant health or environmental risks, the most reasonable options for risk management may be to enact either partial or complete bans on their use. These options create greater moral conflict than other risk management strategies, leaving policymakers difficult choices between competing values.     

Deliberately infecting healthy volunteers with malaria parasites: Perceptions and experiences of participants and other stakeholders in a Kenyan-based malaria infection study

Controlled human malaria infection (CHMI) studies involve the deliberate infection of healthy volunteers with malaria parasites under controlled conditions to study immune responses and/or test drug or vaccine efficacy. An empirical ethics study was embedded in a CHMI study at a Kenyan research programme to explore stakeholders’ perceptions and experiences of deliberate infection and moral implications of these. Data for this qualitative study were collected through focus group discussions, in-depth interviews and non-participant observation. Sixty-nine participants were involved, including CHMI study volunteers, community representatives and research staff. Data were managed using QSR Nvivo 10 and analysed using an inductive-deductive approach, guided by ethics literature. CHMI volunteers had reasonable understanding of the study procedures. Decisions to join were influenced by study incentives, trust in the research institution, their assessment of associated burdens and motivation to support malaria vaccine development. However, deliberate malaria infection was a highly unusual research strategy for volunteers, community representatives and some study staff. Volunteers’ experiences of physical, emotional and social burdens or harms were often greater than anticipated initially, and fluctuated over time, related to specific procedures and events. Although unlikely to deter volunteers' participation in similar studies in furture, we argue that the dissonance between level of understanding of the burdens involved and actual experiences are morally relevant in relation to community engagement, informed consent processes, and ongoing support for volunteers and research staff. We further argue that ethics oversight of CHMI studies should take account of these issues in deciding whether consent, engagement and the balance of benefits and harms are reasonable in a given context.     

Against autonomy: How proposed solutions to the problems of living wills forgot its underlying principle

Significant criticisms have been raised regarding the ethical and psychological basis of living wills. Various solutions to address these criticisms have been advanced, such as the use of surrogate decision makers alone or data science-driven algorithms. These proposals share a fundamental weakness: they focus on resolving the problems of living wills, and, in the process, lose sight of the underlying ethical principle of advance care planning, autonomy. By suggesting that the same sweeping solutions, without opportunities for choice, be applied to all, individual patients are treated as population-level groups—as a theoretical patient who represents a population, not the specific patient crafting his or her individualized future care plans. Instead, advance care planning can be improved through a multimodal approach that both mitigates cognitive biases and allows for customization of the decision-making process by allowing for the incorporation of a variety of methods of advance care planning.     

Ethical Considerations for Outcome‐adaptive Trial Designs: A Clinical Researcher's Perspective

In a typical comparative clinical trial the randomization scheme is fixed at the beginning of the study, and maintained throughout the course of the trial. A number of researchers have championed a randomized trial design referred to as ‘outcome‐adaptive randomization.’ In this type of trial, the likelihood of a patient being enrolled to a particular arm of the study increases or decreases as preliminary information becomes available suggesting that treatment may be superior or inferior. While the design merits of outcome‐adaptive trials have been debated, little attention has been paid to significant ethical concerns that arise in the conduct of such studies. These include loss of equipoise, lack of processes for adequate informed consent, and inequalities inherent in the research design which could lead to perceptions of injustice that may have negative implications for patients and the research enterprise. This article examines the ethical difficulties inherent in outcome‐adaptive trials.